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Abstract—Agile recovery from link failures in autonomic
communication networks is essential to increase robustness,
accessibility, and reliability of data transmission. However, this
must be done with the least amount of protection resources, while
using simple management plane functionality. Recently, network
coding has been proposed as a solution to provide agile and cost
efficient network self-healing against link failures, in a manner
that does not require data rerouting, packet retransmission,
or failure localization, hence leading to simple control and
management planes. To achieve this, separate paths have to be
provisioned to carry encoded packets, hence requiring either the
addition of extra links, or reserving some of the resources for
this purpose.
In this paper we introduce autonomic self-healing strategies
for autonomic networks in order to protect against link failures.
The strategies are based on network coding and reduced capacity,
which is a technique that we call network protection codes (NPC).
In these strategies, an autonomic network is able to provide
self-healing from various network failures affecting network
operation. The techniques improve service and enhance reliability
of autonomic communication.
Network protection codes are extended to provide self-healing
from multiple link failures in autonomic networks. Although this
leads to reducing the network capacity, the network capacity
reduction is asymptotically small in most cases of practical
interest. We provide implementation aspects of the proposed
strategies. We present bounds and network protection code con-
structions. Furthermore tables of the best known self-healing
codes are presented. Finally, we study the construction of such
codes over the binary field. The paper also develops an Integer
Linear Program formulation to evaluate the cost of provisioning
connections using the proposed strategies, and uses results from
this formulation to show that it is more resource efficient from
1+1 protection.
Index Terms—Autonomic networks; network protection codes,
self-healing, link failures, network coding, channel coding, and
code constructions.
I. INTRODUCTION
Today’s communication networks are becoming complex to
the degree that the management of such networks has become
a major task of network operation. Therefore, the use of
network autonomy such that the management functionality
and its complexity, is moved to within the network has
become the preferred approach, hence giving rise to what
is known as autonomic networks [19]. Autonomic networks
are self-managed, and they are efficient, resilient, evolvable,
This paper was presented in part at the IEEE Globecom 2008 Conference,
New Orleans, LA, December 1-4, 2008 [2].
through self-protection, self-organizations, self-configurations,
self-healing and self-optimizations (see for example [8], [10],
[21] and the references therein). Therefore an autonomic
network promotes the autonomy of operational networks with
minimum human involvements. However, it is also important
not to overload the management plane of autonomic networks
to the degree that the management functionality consumes sig-
nificant amount of computing and communication resources.
This paper addresses the self-functionality in autonomic net-
works, and introduces a technique to provide self-healing
that results in simplifying the management plane, as well as
the control plane. The technique uses reduced capacities and
network coding.
Network coding is a powerful tool that has been used to
increase the throughput, capacity, and performance of com-
munication networks [20], [23]. It offers benefits in terms
of energy efficiency, additional security, and reduced delay.
Network coding allows the intermediate nodes not only to
forward packets using network scheduling algorithms, but
also encode/decode them using algebraic primitive operations
(see [1], [7], [20], [23] and references therein).
One application of network coding that has been proposed
recently is to provide network protection against link failures
in overlay networks [12], [15]. This is achieved by transmitting
combinations of data units from multiple connections on a
backup path in a manner that enables each receiver node to
recover a copy of the data transmitted on the working path in
case the working path fails. This can result in recovery from
failures without data rerouting, hence achieving agile protec-
tion. Moreover, the sharing of network protection resources be-
tween multiple connections through the transmission of linear
combinations of data units results in efficient use of protection
resources. This, however, requires the establishment of extra
paths over which the combined data units are transmitted.
Such paths may require the addition of links to the network
under the Separate Capacity Provisioning strategy (SCP), or
that paths be provisioned using existing links if using the
Joint Capacity Provisioning strategy (JCP), hence reducing the
network traffic carrying capacity.
Certain networks can allow extra transmissions and the
addition of bandwidth, but they do not allow the addition of
new transmission lines. In this scenario, one needs to design
efficient data recovery schemes. In this paper, we propose
such an approach in which we use network coding to provide
agile, and resource efficient protection against link failures,
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and without adding extra paths. The approach is based on
combining data units from a number of sources, and then
transmitting the encoded data units using a small fraction of
the bandwidth allocated to the connections, hence disposing of
the requirement of having extra paths. In this scenario, once
a path fails, the receiver can recover the lost packets easily
from the neighbors by initiating simple queries.
Previous solutions in network survivability approaches using
network coding focused on providing backup paths to recover
the data affected by the failures [12], [13], [14]. Such ap-
proaches include 1+N, and M+N protections. In 1+N protec-
tion, an extra secondary path is used to carry combinations
of data units from N different connections, and is therefore
used to protect N primary paths from any single link failure.
The M+N is an extension of 1+N protection where M extra
secondary paths are needed to protect multiple link failures.
In this paper, we introduce autonomic self-healing and
healing-protection network strategies based on network cod-
ing and reduced capacity. In these strategies, an autonomic
network is able to provide self-healing from various network
failures. The techniques improve services and enhance relia-
bility of autonomic communication. We define the concept of
network protection codes similar to error-correcting codes that
are widely used in channel coding [9], [16]. Such codes aim to
provide better provisioning and data recovery mechanisms [2].
The new contributions in this paper are stated as follows:
i) We introduce a self-healing strategy using network coding
and a reduced capacity strategy instead of using dedicated
paths.
ii) We provide a new scheme to protect against a single link
failure in autonomic networks. The scheme is extended
to protect against multiple link failures.
iii) We develop a theoretical foundation of protection codes,
in which the receivers are able to recover data sent over
t failed links out of n primary links.
iv) The developed protection strategies are achieved over the
binary field, hence the encoding and decoding operations
are done using XOR operation.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section II we briefly
state the related work and previous solutions to the network
protection problem against link failures. In Section III we
present the network model and problem definition. Sections IV
and V discuss single and multiple link failures and how to
protect these link failures using reduced capacity and network
coding. In Section VI we give analysis of the general case
of t ≪ n link failures. Sections VII and VIII present code
constructions and bounds on the network protection code
parameters. In Section IX we present an integer linear program
to find the optimal provisioning under the proposed scheme.
Section X introduces some numerical results based on the ILP
and a comparison between 1+1 protection and the proposed
scheme. The paper is concluded in Section XI.
Notations: We fix the notation throughout the paper. Let n, k,
m, and t be the number of total connections, working paths,
protection paths, and failures, respectively, where n = k +m
and t ≤ k. Let Li be a connection from a sender si to a
receiver ri. Let ci be the unit capacity of the connection Li
if it carries plain data (data without coding). F2 is a finite
field with two elements {0, 1}. An [n, k, dmin]2 is a network
protection code defined over F2 that has n connections, k
working paths, n−k = m protection paths, and recovers from
t = dmin − 1 failures, where dmin is the minimum distance
of the code.
II. RELATED WORK
In this section we will state the related work in network
protection strategies against link failures, and linear codes
that are used for erasure channels. We define the concept of
network protection codes similar to error-correcting codes that
are widely used in erasure channel coding [9], [16].
A. Revolution Networks Using Network Coding
Network coding is a powerful tool that has been used
to increase the throughput, capacity, and performance of
communication networks [20], [23]. Network coding assumes
that the network nodes not only can forward incoming mes-
sages/packets, but also can encode, decode them. It offers
benefits in terms of energy efficiency, additional security, and
reduced delay (see [1], [7], [20], [23] and references therein).
Practical aspects of network coding have been investigated
in [6], and bounds on the network coding capacity are inves-
tigated in [3], [18].
B. Protection against Failures Using Network Coding
In [12], the author introduced a 1+N protection model in
optical mesh networks using network coding over p-cycles.
The author suggested a model for protecting N connections
from a set of sources to a set of receivers in a network with n
connections, where only one connection might fail. Hence, the
suggested model can protect against a single link failure in any
arbitrary path connecting a source and destination. In [13], the
author extended the previous model to protect against multiple
link failures. It is shown that protecting against m failures, at
least m p-cycles are needed. The idea was to derive m linearly
independent equations to recover the data sent from m sources.
In [14], the author extended the protection model in [12] and
provided a GMPLS-based implementation of a link protection
strategy that is a hybrid of 1+N and 1:N. It is claimed that the
hybrid 1+N link protection provides protection at higher layers
and with a speed that is comparable to the speed achieved by
the physical layer implementations. In addition, it has less cost
and much flexibility.
In this paper, we provide a new technique for protecting a
network against failures using protection codes and reduced
capacity, and for the network to recover from such failures in
an agile manner. The benefits of our approach are that:
i) It allows receivers to recover the lost data without
data rerouting, data retransmission or failure localization,
hence simplifying the control and management planes.
ii) It has reasonable computational complexity and does not
require adding extra paths or reserving backup paths.
iii) At any point in time, all n connection paths have full
capacity except at one path in case of protecting against
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a single link failure and m < n paths in case of protecting
against t ≤ m link failures.
iv) The working and protection paths capacities are dis-
tributed among each other for fairness.
III. NETWORK MODEL
Let G = (V,E) be a graph which represents the network
topology. V is a set of network nodes and E is a set of edges.
Let there be n unidirectional connections, and let S ⊂ V be
the set of sources {s1, ..., sn} and R ⊂ V \S be the set of
receiver nodes {r1, ..., rn} of the n connections in G. The
case of S ∩ R 6= φ can be easily incorporated in our model.
Two nodes u and v in V are connected by an edge (u, v) in E
if there is a direct connection between them. We assume that
the sources are independent of each other, meaning they can
only send messages and there is no correlation between them.
For simplicity, we will assume that a path exists between si
and ri, and it is disjoint from the path between sj and rj , for
j 6= i.
The network model N can be described in the following
assumptions.
i) Let N be a network with a set of sources
S = {s1, s2, . . . , sn} and a set of receivers
R = {r1, r2, . . . , rn}, where S ∪R ⊂ V .
ii) Let L be a set of links L1, L2, . . . , Ln such that there is a
link Li if and only if there is a connection path between
the sender si and receiver ri, i.e., Li corresponds to the
path
{(si, w1i), (w1i, w2i), . . . , (w(λ)i, ri)}, (1)
where 1 ≤ i ≤ n and (w(j−1)i, wji) ∈ E, for some
integer λ ≥ 1. Hence we have |S| = |R| = |L| = n. The
n connection paths are pairwise link disjoint.
iii) Every source sℓ sends a packet with its own IDsℓ and
data xℓ to the receiver rℓ, so
packetsℓ = (IDsℓ , xℓ, δ), (2)
where δ is the round number of the source packet
packetsℓ .
iv) All packets belonging to the same round are sent in the
same round slot. The senders will exchange the rule of
sending plain and encoded data for fairness, as will be
illustrated below.
v) All links carry uni-directional data from sources to re-
ceivers.
vi) We consider the scenario where the cost of adding a
new path is higher than just combining messages in an
existing path, or there is not enough resources to provision
dedicated paths in the network.
We can define the unit capacity ci of a link Li as follows.
Definition 1: The unit capacity of a connecting path Li
between si and ri is defined by
ci =
{
1, Li is an active working path;
0, otherwise. (3)
What we mean by an active path is that the receiver is able to
receive and process unencoded signals/packets throughout this
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Fig. 1. Network protection against a single path failure using reduced
capacity and network coding. One path out of n primary paths carries encoded
data. The black points represent various other relay nodes
path. Hence, the protection path is assumed to be inactive. The
total capacity of N is given by the summation of all active
path capacities, divided by the number of paths.
This means that each source si can send a maximum of one
packet per unit time on a link Li. Assume that all links have
the same capacity. One can also always assume that a source
with a large rate can be divided into a set of sources, each of
which has a unit link capacity.
The following definition describes the working and protec-
tion paths between two network switches as shown in Fig. (1).
Definition 2: The working paths in a network with n con-
nection paths carry traffic under normal operations. The data
on these paths are sent without encoding. The Protection paths
in our proposed scheme carry encoded data from other sources.
A protection scheme ensures that data sent from the sources
will reach the receivers in case of failure on the working paths.
Our goal is to provide an agile and resource efficient self-
healing method for n connections without adding extra paths.
Unencoded data is sent over a path Li without adding extra
paths. but by possibly reducing the source rates slightly. Linear
combinations of data units are sent on these paths alternately,
and by using the reduction in working path capacities. The
linear combinations are used to recover from failures.
Clearly, if all paths are active then the total capacity of all
connections is n.
In general, the total normalized capacity of the network for
the active and failed paths is computed by
CN =
1
n
n∑
i=1
ci. (4)
IV. PROTECTING NETWORKS AGAINST A SINGLE LINK
FAILURE
In this section we study the problem of protecting a set of
connections against a single link failure in a network N with
a set of sources S and a set of receivers R. This problem
has been studied in [12], [13] by provisioning a path that is
link disjoint from all connection paths, and passes through all
sources and destinations. All source packets are encoded in one
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single packet and transmitted over this path. The encoding is
dynamic in the sense that packets are added and removed at
each source and destination.
Assume that every source si has its own message xi. Also,
source sj forms the encoded data yj which is defined by
yj = x1 ⊕ . . .⊕ xi6=j ⊕ . . .⊕ xn (5)
where the sum is over the finite field F2 = {0, 1}. In this case,
the symbol ⊕ is the XOR operation.
Source si, for i 6= j, sends a packet to the receivers ri,
which is given by
packetsi = (IDsi , xi, δ). (6)
On the other hand,
source sj sends a packet that will carry the encoded data
yj to the receiver rj over the link Lj ,
packetsj = (IDsj , yj, δ). (7)
Now we consider the case where there is a single failure on
link Lk. Therefore, we have two cases:
i) If k = j, the link Lj has a failure, and the receiver rj does
not need to query any other node since link Lj carries
encoded data that is only used for protection. All other
receiver nodes receive their data correctly on links which
have not failed.
ii) If k 6= j, then the receiver rk needs to query the other
(n − 1) nodes in order to recover the lost data xk over
the failed link Lk. The reason is that xk exists either at
rj , and it requires information of all other receivers. xk
can be recovered by adding all other n − 1 data units.
The recovery is implemented by adding yj and all xi for
i 6= j, and i 6= k. This follows from Equation (5).
This shows that only one single receiver needs to perform
(n − 2) addition operations in order to recover its data if its
link fails. In other words, all other receivers will receive the
transmitted data from the senders of their own connections
with a constant operation O(1).
The following example illustrates the plain and encoded data
transmitted from five senders to five receivers.
Example 3: Let S and R be two sets of senders and
receivers, respectively, in the network model N . The following
scheme explains the plain and encoded data sent in five
consecutive rounds from the five senders to the five receivers.
cycle 1 2 3
rounds 1 2 3 4 5 . . . . . .
s1 → r1 y1 x11 x
2
1 x
3
1 x
4
1 . . . . . .
s2 → r2 x
1
2 y2 x
2
2 x
3
2 x
4
2 . . . . . .
s3 → r3 x13 x
2
3 y3 x
3
3 x
4
3 . . . . . .
s4 → r4 x14 x
2
4 x
3
4 y4 x
4
4 . . . . . .
s5 → r5 x15 x
2
5 x
3
5 x
4
5 y4 . . . . . .
(8)
The encoded data yj , for 1 ≤ j ≤ 5, is sent as
yj =
j−1∑
i=1
xj−1i +
5∑
i=j+1
xji . (9)
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Fig. 2. Network protection against a single link failure using reduced capacity
and network coding. One connection out of n primary working paths carries
encoded data, i.e. protection path. There are n−1 active working paths carry
plain data.
We notice that every message has its own round. Hence the
protection data is distributed among all paths for fairness.
A. Network Protection Codes (NPC) for a Single Link Failure
We can define the set of sources that will send encoded
packets by using constraint matrices. We assume that there is
a network protection code C ⊆ Fn2 defined by the constraint
matrix
G=


1 0 . . . 0 1
0 1 . . . 0 1
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
0 0 . . . 1 1


(n−1)×n
(10)
Without loss of generality, in Matrix (10), for 1 ≤ j ≤ n−1,
the column vector ( g1j g2j . . . g(n−1)j )T in Fn−12
corresponds to (n-1) sources, say for example the sources
s1, s2, . . . , sn−1, that will send (update) their values to (n-
1) receivers, say i.e., r1, r2, . . . , rn−1. Also, there exists one
source that will send encoded data, e. g., source n in the
above matrix. The row vector ( gi1 gi2 . . . gin ) in Fn2
determines the channels L1, L2, . . . , Ln.
The weight of a row in G is the number of nonzero
elements. We define dmin to be the minimum weight of a
row in G. Put differently
dmin = min{|gij 6= 0, 1 ≤ j ≤ n|, 1 ≤ i ≤ n− 1} (11)
Hence, since every row in G has weight of two, dmin = 2.
We can now define the network protection code that will
protect a single path failure as follows:
Definition 4: An [n, n− 1, 2] network protection code C is
a n− 1-dimensional subspace of the space Fn2 defined by the
generator systematic matrix G and is able to recover from a
single network failure of an arbitrary path Li.
This means that an [n, n− 1, 2] code over F2 is a code that
encodes (n−1) symbols into n symbols and detects (recovers
from) a single path failure. We note that the network protection
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codes NPC are also error correcting codes that can be used for
erasure channels. The positions of errors (failures) are known.
Remark 5: The number of failures that can be recovered
by an NPC is equal to the minimum distance of the code
minus one, i.e., t = dmin − 1. Sometimes we refer to NPC
by the number of failures t, otherwise they are defined by the
minimum distance dmin as shown in Table (III).
In general we will assume that the code C defined by the
generator matrix G is known for every source si and every
receiver ri. This means that every receiver will be able to
recover the data xi if the link Li fails, provided that Li
is active in the sense defined in Definition (1). Hence, the
rows of the generator matrix G are the basis for the code
C. We assume that the positions of the failures are known.
Furthermore, every source node has a copy of the code C.
Without loss of generality, the protection systematic matrix
among all sources is given by:
L1 L2 · · · Ln−1 Ln
s1 x1 0 · · · 0 x1
s2 0 x2 · · · 0 x2
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
. · · ·
.
.
.
.
.
.
sn−1 0 0 · · · xn−1 xn−1
total x1 x2 . . . xn−1 yn
(12)
where yn is the protection value collected from every source
si that will be encoded at source sn, for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n − 1.
Put differently, we have
yn =
n−1∑
i=1
xi (13)
where the summation operation is defined by the XOR oper-
ation.
In a general scenario, the system operates in cycles, where
each cycle consists of n rounds, such that at round 1 ≤ j ≤ n
of a cycle we have
yj =
n∑
i=1,i6=j
xi (14)
where the round number of a packet xi is not shown for
simplicity with the understanding that it is the first packet
in the source’s output queue. We assume that every source
si has a buffer that stores its value xi and can also send the
protection value yj . Hence in the channel Lj , sj prepares a
packet packetsj that contains the value
packetsj = (IDsj , yj, δ), (15)
and sender si for i 6= j will send its data xi in a packetsi
over the channel Li defined as follows
packetsi = (IDsi , xi, δ), (16)
In general each source will send (n − 1) packets containing
plain data, and exactly one packet contain encoded data in all
n rounds. The transmission will be repeated in cycles, hence
every cycle has n rounds.
Recovery from a single path failure is summarized by the
next two lemmas.
Lemma 6: Encoding the data from sources S\{sj} at a
source sj in the network N is enough to protect against a
single path failure.
Lemma 7: The total number of encoding operations needed
to recover from a single link failure in a network N with
n sources is given by (n − 2) and the total number of
transmissions is n.
The previous lemma guarantees the recovery from a single
arbitrary link failure.
Lemma 8: In the network model N , through out each
cycle, the average network capacity of protecting against a
single link failure using reduced capacity and network coding
is given by (n− 1)/n.
Proof: i) We know that every source si that sends the
data xi over a working path Li has capacity ci = 1. ii) Also,
the source sj sends the encoded data yj at different slots, has
an inactive capacity. iii) The source sj is not fixed among all
nodes S, however, it is rotated periodically over all sources for
fairness. On average one source of the n nodes will reduce its
capacity. This shows the capacity of N as stated.
V. PROTECTING NETWORKS AGAINST MULTIPLE LINK
FAILURES
In the previous section we introduced a strategy for self-
healing from single link failure for autonomic networks.
However, it was shown in [17] through an experimental
study that about %30 of the failures of the Sprint backbone
network are multiple link failures. Hence, one needs to design
a general strategy against multiple link failures for the purpose
of self-healing.
In this section we will generalize the above strategy to
protect against t path failures using network protection codes
(NPC) and the reduced capacity. We have the following
assumptions about the channel model:
i) We assume that any t arbitrary paths may fail and they
may or may not be correlated.
ii) Locations of the failures are known, but they are arbitrary
among n connections.
iii) In order to protect n working paths, k connection must
carry plain data, and m = n− k connections must carry
encoded data.
iv) We do not add extra protection paths, and every source
node is able to encode the incoming packets indepen-
dently.
v) We consider the encoding and decoding operations are
performed over F2.
In Sections VIII and VII we will show the connection between
error correcting codes that are used for erasure channels and
the proposed network protection codes [9], [16].
Assume that the notations in the previous sections hold.
Let us assume a network model N with t > 1 path failures.
One can define a protection code C which protects n links
as shown in the systematic matrix G in (17). In general,
the systematic matrix G defines the source nodes that will
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send encoded messages and source nodes that will send only
plain message without encoding. In order to protect n working
paths, k connection must carry plain data, and m = n − k
connections must carry encoded data.
The generator matrix of the NPC for multiple link failures
is given by:
G =


1 0 . . . 0
0 1 . . . 0
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
0 0 . . . 1
| p11 . . . p1m
| p21 . . . p2m
|
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
| pk1 . . . pkm
identity matrix k × k︸ ︷︷ ︸ Submatrix Pk×m︸ ︷︷ ︸


, (17)
where pij ∈ F2
The matrix G can be rewritten as
G =
[
Ik | P
]
, (18)
where P is the sub-matrix that defines the redundant data∑k
i=1 pij to be sent to a set of sources for the purpose of
self-healing from link failures. Based on the above matrix,
every source si sends its own message xi to the receiver ri
via the link Li. In addition m links out of the n links will carry
encoded data. Let dmin be the minimum distance (minimum
weight) of a nonzero vector in the matrix G.
Definition 9: An [n, k, dmin]2 network protection code C
is a k-dimensional subspace of the space Fn2 that is able to
recover from all network failures up to t = dmin − 1.
In general the network protection code (NPC), which pro-
tects against multiple path failures, can be defined by a
generator matrix G known for every sender and receiver. Also,
there exists a parity check matrix H corresponds to G such
that GHT = 0. We will restrict ourselves in this work for
NPC that are generated by a given generator matrix G in the
systematic. In addition, we will assume that the protection
codes are defined by systematic matrices defined over F2 [9],
[16]. An [n, k, t]2 NPC code is also an [n, k, dmin]2, where
t = dmin − 1.
Without loss of generality, at one particular round and cycle,
the protection matrix (scheme) among all sources is given by
L1 L2 · · · Lk Lk+1 Lk+2 . . . Ln
s1 x1 0 · · · 0 p11x1 p12x1 . . . p1mx1
s2 0 x2 · · · 0 p21x2 p22x2 . . . p2mx2
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
. · · ·
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
sk 0 0 · · · xk pk1xk pk2xk . . . pkmxk
T x1 x2 . . . xk y1 y2 . . . ym
(19)
We ensure that k = n −m paths L1, L2, . . . , Lk have full
capacity and they carry the plain data x1, x2, . . . , xk. Also,
all other m paths have inactive capacity, in which they carry
the encoded data y1, y2, . . . , ym. In addition, the m links are
not fixed, and they are chosen alternatively between the n
connections.
A. Encoding and Recovery Operations
We shall illustrate how the encoding and recovery operations
are achieved at the sources and receivers, respectively.
Encoding Process. The network encoding process at the set
of senders are performed in a similar manner as in Section IV.
Every source si has a copy of the systematic matrix G and it
will prepare a packet along with its ID in two different cases.
First, if the source si will send only its own data xi with a
full link capacity, then
packetsi = (IDsi , xi, δ). (20)
Second, if S is the set of sources sending encoded messages,
then
packetsj = (IDsj ,
k∑
ℓ=1,sℓ /∈S
pℓjxℓ, δ), (21)
where pℓj ∈ F2.
The transmissions are sent in rounds. Therefore, the senders
will alternate the role of sending plain and encoded data for
fairness.
Recovery Process. The recovery process is done as follows.
Assume t failures occur, then a system of linearly independent
equations of t variables (corresponding to the data lost due
to the failed paths) can be solved. The packetsi arrives at a
receiver ri with an associated round number, δ. The receiver
ri at time slot n will detect the signal in the link Li. If the
link Li fails, then ri will send a query to other receivers in
R\{ri} asking for their received data. Assume there are t path
failures. Then we have three cases:
1) All t link failures have occurred in links
that carry encoded packets, i.e., packetsj =
(IDsj ,
∑k
ℓ=1,sℓ /∈S
pljxℓ, δ). In this case no recovery
operations are needed.
2) All t link failures have occurred in links that do not
carry encoded packets, i.e., packetsi = (IDsi , xi, δ). In
this case, one receiver that carries encoded packets, e.g.,
rj , can send n − m − 1 queries to the other receivers
with active links asking for their received data. After this
process, the receiver rj is able to decode all messages
and will send individual messages to all receivers with
link failures to pass their correct data.
3) All t link failures have occurred in arbitrary links. This
case is a combination of the previous two cases and the
recovery process is done in a similar way. Only the lost
data on the working paths need to be recovered.
The proposed network protection scheme using distributed
capacity and coding is able to recover up to t ≤ dmin − 1
link failures (as defined in Definition (9)) among n paths and
it has the following advantages:
i) k = n−m links have full capacity and their sender nodes
have the same transmission rate.
ii) The m links that carry encoded data are dynamic (dis-
tributed) among all n links. So, no single link Li will
always suffer from reduced capacity.
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iii) The encoding process is simple once every sender si
knows the NPC.
iv) The recovery from link failures is done in a dynamic and
simple way. Only one receiver node needs to perform the
decoding process and it passes the data to other receivers
that have link failures.
VI. CAPACITY ANALYSIS
We shall provide theoretical analysis regarding our network
protection codes. One can easily compute the number of
paths needed to carry encoded messages to protect against t
link failures, and compute the average network capacity. The
main idea behind NPC is to simplify the encoding operations
at the sources and the recovery operations at the receivers.
The following lemma demonstrates the average normalized
capacity of the proposed network model N where r failures
occur.
Lemma 10: Let C be a network protection code with pa-
rameters [n, n−m, dmin] over F2. Let n and m be the number
of sources (receivers) and number of connections carrying
encoded packets, respectively, the average normalized capacity
of the network N is given by
(n−m)/n. (22)
Proof: At one particular round, we have m protection
paths that carry encoded data. Hence there are n−m working
paths that carry plain data. The result is a direct consequence
by applying the normalized capacity definition.
Remark 11: In the network protection model N , in order to
protect t network disjoint link failures, the minimum distance
dmin of the protection code must be at least t+ 1.
The previous remark ensures that the maximum number of
failures that can be recovered is dmin − 1, where dmin is the
minimum distance of the network protection code. For sim-
plicity, we denote a NPC defined over F2 by [n, n−m, dmin]2
unless stated otherwise.
For example one can use the Hamming codes with param-
eters [2r− 1, 2r− r− 1, 3]2 to recover from two failures. One
can also puncture or extend these codes to reach the required
length, i.e., number of connection, see [9] for deriving new
codes from known codes by puncturing, extending, shortening
those codes. [7, 4, 3]2, [15, 11, 3]2, and [63, 57, 3]2 are exam-
ples of Hamming codes that protect against two link failures.
The protection code [15, 11, 3] has 15 connections among them
are 11 working paths and 4 protection paths, in addition the
minimum distance is 3 and the code protects 2 link failures.
Another example is the BCH codes with arbitrary design
distance, i.e., [n, k, dmin ≥ δ]2. It is well known that the
minimum distance of a BCH code is greater than or equal to
its designed distance. References [15, 11, 3]2, [31, 26, 3]2 and
[63, 56, 3]2 are examples of BCH codes that protect up to two
link failures. Also, [15, 8, 5]2, [31, 21, 5]2 and [48, 36, 5]2 are
examples of BCH codes against four link failures [9], [16].
In the next section we will include tables of the best known
network protection codes.
VII. CODE CONSTRUCTIONS AND BOUNDS
Assume we have n established connections in the network
model N . The goal is to design a good protection code that
protects t failures. What we mean by a good protection code
is that for given number of connections n and failures t, it has
large number of working paths. Hence the protection code has
a high performance. In addition, we establish bounds on the
network protection code parameters in the next section.
One way to achieve our goal is to design codes with
arbitrary minimum distances. The reader can consult any
introductory coding theory book, for example [16], [9]. In this
case a BCH code with designed distance d and length n can
be used to deploy this goal.
We shall quickly review the essential construction of non-
primitive narrow-sense BCH codes that will be used in the next
section. Let q be a prime power, and n, µ and d be positive
integers such that gcd(q, n) = 1, and 2 ≤ d ≤ n. Furthermore,
µ is the multiplicative order of q modulo n. Let α be a
primitive element in Fqµ . A nonprimitive narrow-sense BCH
code C of designed distance d and length q⌊µ/2⌋ < n ≤ qµ−1
over Fq is a cyclic code with a generator monic polynomial
g(x) that has α, α2, . . . , αd−1 as zeros,
g(x) =
d−1∏
i=1
(x − αi). (23)
Thus, c is a codeword in C if and only if c(α) = c(α2) =
. . . = c(αd−1) = 0. The parity check matrix of this code can
be defined as
Hbch =


1 α α2 · · · αn−1
1 α2 α4 · · · α2(n−1)
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
1 αd−1 α2(d−1) · · · α(d−1)(n−1)

 . (24)
If the minimum distance of this code is dmin ≥ d, then
the code can recover up to dmin − 1 failures. In this case the
number of connections that will carry plain data is given by:
k ≤ n− µ⌈(d− 1)(1− 1/q)⌉. (25)
But this is an upper bound in the dimension of the NPC,
aka, the number of working connections that carry plain data.
Therefore, we seek a result to determine the exact dimension.
Fortunately, this can be obtained when the designed distance
of BCH codes are bounded. The following Theorem enables
one to determine the dimension in closed form for BCH code
of small designed distance.
Theorem 12: Let q be a prime power and gcd(n, q) = 1,
with qµ ≡ 1 mod n.Then a narrow-sense BCH code of length
q⌊µ/2⌋ < n ≤ qµ − 1 over Fq with designed distance d in the
range 2 ≤ d ≤ dmax = min{⌊nq⌈µ/2⌉/(qµ − 1)⌋, n}, has
dimension of
k = n− µ⌈(d− 1)(1− 1/q)⌉. (26)
Proof: See [4, Theorem 10].
For small designed distance d we can exactly compute
the minimum distance of the BCH code, see Tables (I), (II),
and (III). Consequently, determine the dimension of the pro-
tection code. This helps us to compute the number of failures
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TABLE I
BEST KNOWN network protection codes AGAINST SINGLE AND DOUBLE
LINK FAILURES
n m code type
7 3 [7, 4, 3]2 Hamming code
10 4 [10, 6, 3]2 Linear code
15 4 [15, 11, 3]2 Hamming code
19 7 [19, 12, 3]2 Extension construction
23 8 [23, 15, 3]2 Extension construction
25 5 [25, 20, 3]2 Linear code
31 5 [31, 26, 3]2 Hamming code
39 8 [39, 31, 3]2 Extension construction
47 9 [47, 38, 3]2 Extension construction
63 6 [63, 57, 3]2 Hamming code
71 8 [71, 63, 3]2 Matrix construction
79 9 [79, 70, 3]2 Extension construction
95 10 [95, 85, 3]2 Extension construction
127 7 [127, 120, 3]2 Hamming code
that the network protection code can recover. In practical cases,
the number of failures t is small in comparison to the number
of connections n that makes it easy to exactly compute the
parameters of the network protection codes. Theorem (12)
made it explicit straightforward to derive the exact parameters
of NPC based on BCH codes.
We shall give many families of NPC codes derived from
BCH codes over F2. One final thing is that one can also start
by a code for a given length n, and will be able to puncture,
shorten, or extend this code, see [9, Chapter 1.]. This will
dramatically change the number of working and protection
paths and failures which the code can recover.
A. Bounds on the Code Parameters
Bounds on the code parameters are needed to measure
its performance and error recovery and detection capabilities.
For a given code parameters length n and dimension k, we
establish a bound on the minimum distance of the protection
codes derived in the previous section.
The most well-known upper bounds on error-correcting
codes over symmetric and erasure channels are the Single-
ton and Hamming bounds [16], [9]. The Singleton bound
establishes the relationship between the length, dimension,
and minimum distance of the code parameters, i.e. n, k, and
dmin. However, it does not specify the connection between
code parameters and the alphabets size q. The packing bound,
known as Hamming bound, takes in consideration the codes
parameters n, k, dmin along with q.
We can also state upper bounds on the network protection
codes [16], [9]. The Singleton bound on the network protection
code parameters are stated as follows. Let t be the number of
failure that the code can protect.
t ≤ n− k (27)
The equality in this bound will hold if the size of the used
finite field is greater than n− t.
One can also state the Hamming bound in the network code
TABLE II
BEST KNOWN network protection codes AGAINST UP TO FOUR LINK
FAILURES. SUCH CODES CAN BE PUNCTURED, EXTENDED, OR SHORTENED
TO OBTAIN THE REQUIRED LENGTH AS SHOWN IN SECTION VIII.
n m code type
15 7 [15, 8, 5]2 Hamming code
19 8 [19, 11, 5]2 Lengthening Hamming-Preparata code
20 11 [20, 9, 5]2 Lengthening Hamming-Preparata code
23 9 [23, 14, 5]2 Linear code
31 10 [31, 21, 5]2 BCH code
33 10 [33, 23, 5]2 Linear code
35 13 [35, 22, 5]2 Shorting Preparata code
63 11 [63, 52, 5]2 Preparata code
70 12 [70, 58, 5]2 Lengthening Hamming-Preparata code
81 13 [81, 68, 5]2 Linear code
128 14 [128, 114, 5]2 BCH code
135 18 [135, 117, 5]2 Shorting Preparata code
parameters as follows.
⌊(dmin−1)/2⌋∑
i=0
(
n
i
)(
q − 1
)i
≤ qn−k (28)
For the binary Hamming bound of m protection paths
⌊t/2⌋∑
i=0
(
n
i
)
≤ 2m (29)
We have the following lemma on the minimum number of
protection paths of network protection code parameters.
Lemma 13:
m ≥ max
{
dmin − 1, logq
( ⌊t/2⌋∑
i=0
(
n
i
)(
q − 1
)i)}
(30)
Proof: The proof is a direct consequence from the Single-
ton and Hamming bounds. Applying Equations (27) and (28)
gives the result.
VIII. TABLES OF BEST KNOWN PROTECTION CODES
In this section we investigate which codes are suitable for
network self-healing against link failures. We will present
several network protection codes with given generator matrices
and exact parameters. The proposed codes are not necessarily
optimal, i.e. they do not saturate the Singleton bound. The
classical Singleton bound is given by
k ≤ n− dmin + 1 (31)
This bound shows that the number of protection paths must
be at least dmin − 1, i.e., m ≥ dmin − 1. The equality of this
inequality occurs in case of a single path failure.
We notice that all senders do not participate in the encoding
vectors. This means that the proposed codes are suitable for
the general protection case where a set of working paths
is protected by a protection path. This will reduce our pro-
posed codes to be also used for network protection using p-
cycle [14], [12].
The codes shown in Table (I) are used to protect against
single and double link failures using their symmetric generator
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TABLE III
FAMILIES OF BCH CODES THAT CAN BE USED AS network protection codes
AGAINST LINK FAILURES.
n m BCH Code
15 4 [15, 11, 3]
15 7 [15, 8, 4]
15 8 [15, 7, 5]
31 5 [31, 26, 3]
31 5 [31, 26, 3]
31 10 [31, 21, 5]
31 15 [31, 16, 7]
31 10 [31, 11, 11]
31 25 [31, 6, 15]
127 14 [127, 113, 5]
127 49 [127, 78, 15]
127 21 [127, 106, 7]
127 50 [127, 77, 27]
matrices. Also, the codes in Table (II). Table (III) presents the
best known BCH codes for arbitrary minimum distance over
F2.
Given a NPC with parameters [n, k, dmin], one can possibly
obtain a new NPC by shortening, extending, or puncturing
this code. If there is an NPC C with parameters [n, k, dmin]2,
then by i) shortening C yields a code with parameters [n −
1, k−1, dmin]2, ii) puncturing C yields a code with parameters
[n − 1, k, dmin − 1]2, iii) appending C yields a code with
parameters [n+1, k, dmin+1]2, iv) extending C yields a code
with parameters [n+ 1, k + 1, dmin]2.
For example, if there is a BCH Hamming code with
parameters [15, 11, 3]]2, then there must be codes with param-
eters [14, 10, 3]2 (by shortening), [14, 11, 2]2 (by puncturing),
[16, 11, 4]2 (by appending), [16, 12, 3]2 (by extending). The
interested readers might consult textbooks in classical coding
theory for further propagation rules [9], [16].
A. Illustrative Examples
Example 14: Consider a BCH code C with parameters
[15, 11, 3]2 that has designed distance 3 and generator matrix
G given by:


1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 1
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1


(32)
The code C over F2 can be used to recover from two link
failures since its minimum distance is 3. One can puncture,
shorten, or extend this code to obtain the required code length,
which determines the total number of disjoint connections.
In this example we have 15 connections, and 11 primary
working paths. Furthermore, the links L12, L13, L14, L15 will
carry encoded data. The matrix G presents the construction of
NPC, and the senders that will send encoded and plain data.
Example 15: The code C has parameters [15, 8, 4]2 and
generator matrix G given by:


1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 1
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 1
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 1


(33)
This means that all senders s1, . . . , s8 will send plain data
over the working connection L1, . . . , L8. Also, the senders
s9, . . . , s15 will send encoded data over the protection paths
L9, . . . , L15. In this encoding scheme, the connection L9 will
carry encoded data from s1, s5, s7 and s8.
IX. ILP FORMULATION
The problem of finding link disjoint paths between pairs of
nodes in a graph is known to be an NP-complete problem [22].
Hence, even finding the working paths in this problem is hard.
We therefore introduce an Integer Linear Program (ILP) for
solving the reduced capacity network coding-based protection
problem introduced in this paper.
The purpose of the ILP is to find a feasible provisioning for
groups of connections, such that:
• The paths used by a group of connections protected
together are mutually link disjoint.
• There is a circuit, S, which connects the sources of all
connections protected together, and this circuit is link
disjoint from the working paths. The S circuit is used
to exchange source data units in order to form the linear
combination of data units to be sent on the path used for
that purpose.
• There is a circuit, R, which connects the receivers of
all connections protected together, and this circuit is link
disjoint from the working paths. The R circuit is used
by the receivers to recover from lost data units due to a
failure.
• The total number of links used by the working paths, the
S circuit and the R circuit is minimal.
We assume that the number of channels per span is not
upper bounded, i.e., the network is uncapacitated.
The following table defines the input parameters to the ILP:
N number of connections
sh source of connection h
rh destination of connection h
δhl a binary indicator which is equal to 1 if connec-
tions h and l have the same destination
γhl a binary indicator which is equal to 1 if connec-
tions h and l have the same source
The variables used in the formulation are given below:
SUBMITTED TO IEEE JOURNAL OF SELECTED AREAS IN COMMUNICATIONS (J-SAC), 2008. 10
nhl binary variable which is 1 if and only if connec-
tions h and l are protected together
zhij binary variable which is 1 if and only if connec-
tion h uses link (i, j) on the working path
phij binary variable which is 1 if and only if connec-
tion h uses link (i, j) on its S circuit
qhij binary variable which is 1 if and only if connec-
tion h uses link (i, j) on its R circuit
bhi,j binary variable which is 1 if connection h uses
link (i, j) on its backup path
P hlj binary variable, which is 1 if and only if the S
circuits for connections h and l share a node, j
(required if nhl = 1).
Qhlj binary variable, which is 1 if and only if the R
circuits for connections h and l share a node, j
(required if nhl = 1 and δhl = 0).
P h binary variable, which is 1 if and only if con-
nection h is protected with another connection
that has a source different than that of h (this
variable is important since if h is not protected
with another such connection, there is no need
for the S circuit).
Qh binary variable, which is 1 if and only if con-
nection h is protected with another connection
that has a destination different than that of h
(this variable is also important since if h is not
protected with another such connection, there is
no need for the R circuit).
Phlij binary variable which is 1 if and only if connec-
tions h and l are protected together, and share link
(i, j) on the S circuit.
Qhlij binary variable which is 1 if and only if connec-
tions h and l are protected together, and share link
(i, j) on the R circuit.
pihi,j binary variable which is equal to 1 if connection
h is the lowest numbered connection, among a
number of jointly protected connections, to use
link (i, j) on its S circuit (used in computing the
cost of the S circuit).
θhi,j binary variable which is equal to 1 if connection
h is the lowest numbered connection, among a
number of jointly protected connections, to use
link (i, j) on its R circuit (used in computing the
cost of the R circuit).
βhi,j binary variable which is equal to 1 if the sec-
ondary protection path for connection j uses link
(i, j).
Minimize:
∑
i,j,h
(zhi,j + β
h
i,j + 0.5pi
h
i,j + 0.5θ
h
i,j)
In the above, the summation is the cost of the links used by
the connections’ working paths and the S and R circuits. It
also includes the cost of a secondary circuit for 1+1 protection,
in case network coding-based protection cannot be used. The
calculation of these cost factors will be explained using the
constraints below.
Subject to:
The following constraints are enforced in the working and
protection paths.
I- Constraints on working paths:
zhi,sh = 0 ∀h, i 6= sh (34)
zhrh,j = 0 ∀h, j 6= rh (35)∑
i6=sh
zhsh,i = 1 ∀h (36)
∑
i6=rh
zhi,rh = 1 ∀h (37)
∑
i
zhij =
∑
i
zhji ∀h, j 6= sh, rh (38)
zhij + z
h
ji + z
l
ij + z
l
ji + n
hl ≤ 2 ∀h, l, i, j (39)
Equations (34), (36), (35) and (37) ensure that the traffic on
the working path is generated and consumed by the source and
destination nodes, respectively. Equation (38) guarantees flow
continuity on the working path. Equation (39) ensures that the
working paths of two connections which are protected together
are link disjoint. Since a working path cannot use two links in
opposite directions on the same span (or edge in the graph),
then two connections which are protected together cannot use
the same span either in the same, or opposite directions. Such
a condition is included in Equation (39).
II- Constraints on secondary protection circuits:
bhi,sh = 0 ∀h, i 6= sh (40)
bhrh,j = 0 ∀h, j 6= rh (41)∑
i6=sh
bhsh,i = 1 ∀h (42)
∑
i6=rh
bhi,rh = 1 ∀h (43)
∑
i
bhij =
∑
i
bhji ∀h, j 6= sh, rh (44)
βhij ≥ b
h
ij −
∑
l
nhl ∀h, l, i, j (45)
βhij + z
h
ij ≤ 1 ∀h, i, j (46)
The above constraints evaluate the cost of the secondary
protection paths used for 1+1 protection. There are two sets
of variables in the calculation of this cost. The first one is
the bhij variables, which are evaluated in Equations (40)-(44)
using exactly the same way the zhij variables are evaluated.
However, the cost that goes into the objective function depends
on whether connection h is protected with another connection
using network coding or not. The variables which evaluate
this cost are the βhij variables, and are evaluated in Equation
(45), which makes it equal to bhij only if the connection is
not protected with another connection. Finally, Equation (46)
makes sure that the working and the used secondary paths are
link disjoint.
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III- Constraints on P circuits:
P h ≥ nhl − γhl ∀h, l (47)∑
i
phshi = P
h ∀h, i 6= sh (48)
∑
i
phish = P
h ∀h, i 6= sh (49)
∑
i
phij =
∑
i
phji ∀h, j (50)
zhij +
phij + p
h
ji
2
≤ 1 ∀h, i, j (51)
zhij +
plij + p
l
ji
2
+ nhl ≤ 2 ∀h, i, j (52)∑
i
(phij + p
l
ij) ≥ 2P
hl
j ∀h, l, j (53)
∑
i
(phji + p
l
ji) ≥ 2P
hl
j ∀h, l, j (54)
∑
j
P hlj ≥ n
hl − γhl ∀h, l (55)
Equation (47) ensures that the source of connection, h will
be connected to a S circuit only if it is jointly protected with
another connection, l. However, there is one exception to this
case, which is the case in which the two connections h and l
have the same source. In this case, the S circuit is not needed,
and this is why γhl is subtracted from the right hand side
of the equation. Notice that if h is protected together with
another connection that has a different source, then Equation
(47) will then require that a S circuit be used. Equations (48)
and (49) will ensure that traffic leaves and enters sh using the
S circuit, only if it is jointly protected with another connection
that has a different source, i.e., when P h = 1. Equation (50)
guarantees connection h’s flow continuity on the S circuit.
Equation (51) makes sure that the working path and its S
circuit are link disjoint, while Equation (52) makes sure that if
two connections h and l are jointly protected, then the S circuit
of l must also be disjoint from the working path of connection
h. Notice that both of Equations (51) and (52) allow a S circuit
to use two links in opposite directions on the same span, and
this is why the sum of the corresponding link usage variables
is divided by 2 in both equations. Equations (53), (54) and
(55) make sure that if two connections, h and l, are protected
together (nhl = 1), then their S circuits must have at least one
joint node (P hlj = 1 for some j). However, similar to Equation
(47), a S circuit is not needed if the two connections have the
same source, hence the subtraction of γhl from the right hand
side of Equation (55).
Notice that in the ILP formulation, the constraints imple-
ment the S circuit as a set of paths, such that there is a path
from each source back to itself. However, the requirement of
at least one joint node between every pair of such paths as
enforced by constraint (55) will make sure that the S circuit
takes the form of a tree.
IV- Constraints on R circuits:
Qh ≥ nhl − δhl ∀h, l (56)∑
i
qhrhi = Q
h ∀h, i 6= rh (57)
∑
i
qhirh = Q
h ∀h, i 6= rh (58)
∑
i
qhij =
∑
i
qhji ∀h, j (59)
zhij +
qhij + q
h
ji
2
≤ 1 ∀h, i, j (60)
zhij +
qlij + q
l
ji
2
+ nhl ≤ 2 ∀h, i, j (61)∑
i
(qhij + q
l
ij) ≥ 2Q
hl
j ∀h, l, j (62)
∑
i
(qhji + q
l
ji) ≥ 2Q
hl
j ∀h, l, j (63)
∑
j
Qhlj ≥ n
hl − δhl ∀h, l (64)
Equations (56)-(64) are similar to Equations (47)-(55), but
they apply to the destinations and to the R circuit. Therefore,
the variables P h, γhl, phij and P hlj are replaced by Qh, δhl,
qhij and Qhlj , respectively.
Constraints on joint protection:
nhl + nlm − 1 ≤ nhm ∀h, l,m (65)
Equation (65) makes sure that if connections h and l are
protected together, and connections l and m are also protected
together, then connections h and m are protected together.
V- Constraints for cost evaluation:
Phlij ≤
phij + p
l
ij + n
hl
3
∀i, j, h, l (66)
Qhlij ≤
qhij + q
l
ij + n
hl
3
∀i, j, h, l (67)
pilij ≥ p
l
ij −
l−1∑
h=1
Phlij ∀l, i, j (68)
θlij ≥ q
l
ij −
l−1∑
h=1
Qhlij ∀l, i, j (69)
Equations (66), (67), (68) and (69) are used to evaluate the
cost of the S and R circuits, which are used in the objective
function. Equation (66) will make sure that Phlij cannot be 1
unless connections h and l are protected together and share
link ij on the S circuit. Equation (67) will do the same thing
for the R circuit. Note that both Phlij and Qhlij should be
as large as possible since this will result in decreasing the
cost of the S and R circuits, as shown in Equations (68) and
(69). In equation (68), pilij for connection l will be equal to
1 only if it is not protected on link ij with another lower
indexed connection, and will be equal to 0 otherwise. That
is, it is the lowest numbered connection among a group of
jointly protected connections that will contribute to the cost
of the links shared by the S circuit. θlij which is evaluated by
Equation (69) will also follow a similar rule, but for the R
circuit.
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TABLE IV
COST COMPARISON BETWEEN 1+1 AND 1+N PROTECTION FOR
NETWORKS WITH |V | = 6, |E| = 9; |V | = 8, |E| = 12; AND
|V | = 10, |E| = 20.
|V |, |E| N 1+1 NPC
Total Working Spare Total Working Spare
4 15 6 9 14 6 8
6, 9 5 17 6 11 12 6 6
4 19 9 10 16 8 8
8, 12 6 26 10 16 21 11 10
4 16 6 10 12 6 6
10,20 6 23 10 13 19 9 10
X. ILP EVALUATION AND COST COMPARISON
In this section results from the ILP formulation developed
in the previous section to evaluate the cost of provisioning
circuits to provide self-healing in autonomic networks using
the proposed network protection codes. The ILP was solved
using the Cplex linear programming solver [11]. We also
compare the cost of provisioning NPC to that of provisioning
1+1 protection. The cost of 1+1 protection is evaluated using
Bhandari’s algorithm [5].
We ran the ILP for various network topologies. The net-
work topologies are generated randomly. First, we consider a
bidirectional network with 6 nodes and 9 edges along with
4 and 5 connections. Second, we consider a network with 8
nodes and 12 edges along with 4 and 6 connections. Finally,
we consider a network with 10 nodes and 20 edges, while
provisioning 4 and 6 connections.
The results shown in Table (IV) indicate that the cost of
provisioning self-healing using NPC is always lower than that
using 1+1 protection, and the saving in the protection resources
can reach up to 30%. strategy. For example, consider a network
with 8 nodes, 12, and 6 connections. The total cost of using
the 1+1 strategy is 26, while the total cost of using NPC is
21. The total saving in resources in this case is close to 20%.
However, the saving in the protection resources only is more
than 30%. The advantage of using NPC over 1+1 protection
may even improve further with the size of the network. For
example, for the case of the network with 10 nodes, 20 edges,
and 4 connections, the total cost of 1+1 protection is 16, while
the total cost of NPC is 12, which means a total saving of 25%.
The saving in the protection resources is also 40% in this case.
XI. CONCLUSIONS
We studied a model for recovering from network link
failures using network coding. We defined the concept of
network protection codes to protect against a single link
failure, and then extended this concept and the techniques
to protect against t link failures using network coding and
reduced capacity. Such protection codes provide self-healing in
autonomic networks with a reduced control and management
plane complexity. We showed that the encoding and decoding
processes are simple and can be done in a dynamic way.
We also developed an ILP formulation to optimally provision
communication sessions and the circuits needed to implement
NPC. This formulation was then used to assess the cost of
implementing this strategy, and to compare it to the cost of
using 1+1 protection. It was shown that the use of NPC for
self-healing has an advantage over 1+1 protection, in terms of
the cost of connection and backup circuit provisioning.
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